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Conflicting Reasons, Unconflicting ‘Ought’s 
Shyam Nair 
 
0. Introduction 
 One of the popular albeit controversial ideas in the last century of moral philosophy is that what we 
ought to do is explained by our reasons.1 I will call this idea as REASONS EXPLAIN ‘OUGHT’S.2 One of the 
central features of reasons that accounts for their popularity among normative theorists is that they can 
conflict. For example, the fact that reasons conflict promises to give a neat explanation of (i) why in standard 
choice situations, an agent faces the task of choosing among a variety of incompatible options each of which 
has something to be said for it and (ii) how the competition of these conflicting considerations determines 
what such an agent ought to do. But in this paper, I argue that the fact that reasons conflict actually poses a 
problem for those who accept REASONS EXPLAIN ‘OUGHT’S. 
 In fact, I argue that there are two closely related problems (or, if you prefer, two different ways of 
arriving at the same problem) that illustrate how difficult it is to make sense of cases involving conflicting 
reasons if we accept REASONS EXPLAIN ‘OUGHT’S. The first problem is a generalization of a problem in 
deontic logic concerning the existence of conflicting ‘ought’s (§1). The second problem arises from a tension 
between three ethical principles (§2-3). Having presented each of these problems, I develop a unified solution 
to them that is informed by results in both ethics and deontic logic. An important implication of this solution 
is that we must distinguish between derivative and non-derivative reasons and reconsider what the 
commitments of REASONS EXPLAIN ‘OUGHT’S really are (§4-5). 
 The approach that I will take to these questions will be mildly formal. I do not assume that this 
methodology is to be privileged over other approaches. Rather, what I will do is present a number of simple 
cases that need to be explained and a number of plausible ethical principles that need to be accommodated. 
And I will show that in order to do this, we must spell out in more detail the connection between reasons and 
‘ought’s that REASONS EXPLAIN ‘OUGHT’S claims. I will then consider certain simple and tempting principles 
describing formal connections among reasons and ‘ought’s that might be used to explain these cases and 
accommodate these principles. I show that these initially tempting principles are inadequate and then go on to 
describe my prefered set of principles for solving these problems. The ability to handle these cases and 
accommodate these principles will be one piece of evidence in favor of my prefered set of principles and 
approach to the problem. That said, those who prefer an approach that eschews formal connections and 
formal modelling are free to develop alternative solutions to these problems. What I wish to do is only put 
                                               
1 Though he uses different terminology, I take this idea to originate in Ross 1930. Other classic discussions include  Dancy 2004a, 
Nagel 1970, Parfit 2011, Raz 2002, and Scanlon 1998. 
2 For simplicity, I adopt the assumption that ‘ought’ and ‘should’ are roughly synonymous. 
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the problems on the table and develop one systematic solution to these problems that spells out the details of 
the connection between reasons and ‘ought’s. Comparing this solution to alternatives is a tasks that must be 
postponed until the time when alternative solutions are developed.  
 
1. The First Problem 
 To begin to see the first problem, consider the following pair of cases: 
 
Speeding Law: The laws of the country set the speed limit at fifty miles per hour. We may 
suppose then that drivers have a reason to drive slower than fifty miles per hour. Given that 
drivers have a reason to drive slower than fifty miles per hour, drivers also have a reason to 
drive slower than one hundred miles per hour.3 
 
Fighting or Serving: Smith’s country requires him to fight in the army or perform alternative 
public service. We may suppose then that Smith has a reason to fight in the army or perform 
alternative public service. Smith is also deeply committed to a pacifist religion that requires 
him not fight in the army. We may suppose then that Smith has a reason to not to fight in 
the army. Given that Smith has a reason to fight or serve and given that Smith has a reason 
to not to fight, Smith also has a reason to serve.4 
 
In Speeding Law, there is a reason to drive slower than one hundred miles per hour given that there is a reason 
to drive slower than fifty miles per hour. In Fighting or Serving, there is a reason to perform alternative public 
service given that there is a reason to fight or serve and that there is a reason to not fight. The first problem 
arises when we try to develop a systematic account why there are these reasons in cases that have the 
structure of Speeding Law and Fighting or Serving. 
 Before we look at what some systematic accounts might look like, it worth discussing which of the 
many senses of ‘reason’ and ‘ought’ we are focusing on in this paper.  While I believe that the main ideas of 
this paper will apply to any sense of ‘reason’ and ‘ought’ for which REASONS EXPLAIN ‘OUGHT’S is plausible, 
I will for concreteness fix on one. I will be discussing what can be called objective normative reasons. To 
borrow the now standard terminology of Scanlon 1998, an objective normative reason for an agent to do 
some act is a fact or true proposition that “counts in favor” of the agent doing that act. What we have 
objective normative reason to do depends, in the first instance, on what the facts are and not what our beliefs 
are. The ‘ought’s that I will be discussing can be called objective all-things-considered ‘ought’s. These objective 
‘ought’s similarly depend on the facts and not our beliefs about the facts. What makes these ‘ought’s all-things-
considered is that they hold in light of all the relevant normative considerations rather than only considerations 
from one domain such as, e.g., morality or prudence. 
                                               
3 Cf. Cariani 2013: n. 1. 
4 Cf. van Fraassen 1973: 18, Horty 2003: 578, Goble 2009: 459. It may also be worth noting that this case assumes a kind of pluralism 
about the sources of our reasons (in this case, one reason is due to the laws and the other is due to personal commitments). While the 
details of our reasons’ sources are controversial, pluralism in general has been a commitment in the spirit of the popular idea in ethics 
since Ross. In any case, this pluralism is inessential to the structure of this case and is included only out of deference to the history of 
the case. 
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 With this in mind, let us return to considering how to give a systematic account of the reasons 
involved our opening pair of cases. While there are many possible answers to this question, formal principles 
describe entailments among reasons perhaps provide the simplest general answer to this question: these 
principles provide natural explanations of why there are certain reasons given the presence of other reasons. In 
particular, the following two principles seem like the simplest and most obvious ones that do the job: 
 
Single Reason Closure: if there is a reason for S to do a and doing a involves doing b, then there 
is a reason for S to do b5 
 
Consistent Reasons Agglomeration: if there is a reason for S to do a, there is a reason for S to do b, 
and S can do a and b, then there is a reason for S to do a and b6 
 
Single Reason Closure allows us to explain Speeding Law. Why is there a reason to drive less than one hundred 
miles per hour in that case? Given that there is a reason to drive less than fifty miles per hour and given that 
driving less than fifty miles per hour involves driving less than one hundred miles per hour, Single Reason 
Closure tells us that there must be a reason to drive less than one hundred miles per hour. 
 Single Reason Closure alone cannot however show that there is a reason to perform alternative public 
service in Fighting or Serving. But Single Reason Closure would give us this reason if somehow we could get a 
reason to [(fight or serve) and not fight]. Here Consistent Reasons Agglomeration helps. Given that there is a 
reason to fight or serve, that there is a reason to not fight, and that Smith can [(fight or serve) and not fight], 
Consistent Reasons Agglomeration tells us there must be a reason to [(fight or serve) and not fight]. This then 
allows Single Reason Closure to apply and complete our explanation of why there is a reason to serve in Fighting 
or Serving: since [(fighting or serving) and not fighting] involves serving, there is a reason to serve. So together 
Single Reason Closure and Consistent Reasons Agglomeration provide a tidy treatment of our opening cases. 
 But despite its tidiness, this treatment of these cases cannot be correct. This is because Single Reason 
Closure and Consistent Reasons Agglomeration cannot both be true. The crucial premise in the argument that 
demonstrates this is the platitude that we began the paper with, reasons can conflict. Though the argument 
                                               
5 Throughout the main text, I will rely on our pretheortical grasp of the notion of doing one act involving doing another. Appendix 
two provides a simple formal model of this notion of involvement in terms of logical entailment in propositional logic (other more 
complicated formal models are also possible though I do not have the space in this paper to develop them). 
6 Three clarifications may be in order. First, for it to be the case that S can do a is for doing a to be under S’s intentional control in the 
sense that both (a) if S intends to do a, S does a and (b) if S intends to not do a, then S does not do a. 
Second, claims about reasons are naturally understood to be doubly-tensed in much the way other constructions such as 
‘want’-constructions are. For example, ‘John wants to eat dinner’ is tenses both on the time of the wanting and the time of the thing 
wanted (this can be made vivid by comparing the meaning of ‘Tomorrow it will be the case that John wants to eat dinner’ and ‘John 
wants to eat dinner tomorrow’. In most natural contexts, the time of the wanting is tomorrow in the first but not the second. And the 
time of the thing wanted is tomorrow in the second). I intend Consistent Reasons Agglomeration to concern cases where the time of the 
reason is the same but the time of the thing that there is a reason to do may be different (though of course whether an agent can do 
two acts may depend on the time of the things that there is a reason to do). 
Third, throughout this paper, I will concentrate on what there is a reason to do. An interesting further question is what the 
reason is to do it. A generalization of the formal model that I describe in appendix two answers this question, but I do not have the 
space here to present this theory (though the theory entails that the reason do the conjunction is the a conjunction of the reasons to 
do each conjunct). In any case, it is not strictly speaking required to present or solve the problems that I describe in this paper. 
Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me to clarify these issues. 
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doesn’t require this, it is easiest to illustrate how it works by assuming there is a particular instance of 
conflicting reasons, one to do an act and one to not do that act. For example: 
 
(1) There is a reason to meet Sam for a drink 
 
(2) There is a reason to not meet Sam for a drink 
 
By Single Reason Closure applied to (1), we may infer: 
 
(3) There is a reason to [meet Sam for a drink or torture a kitten] 
 
Since you can [[meet Sam for a drink or torture a kitten] and not meet Sam for a drink], we may apply 
Consistent Reasons Agglomeration to (2) and (3) and infer: 
 
(4) There is a reason to [[meet Sam for a drink or torture a kitten] and not meet Sam for a 
drink] 
 
Finally by Single Reason Closure again, we may infer: 
 
(5) There is a reason to torture a kitten 
 
Thus, the existence of conflicting reasons concerning meeting Sam for a drink together with Single Reason 
Closure and Consistent Reasons Agglomeration entail the intuitively unacceptable existence of reason to torture a 
kitten. In fact, this is an instance of a more general result that does not require the assumption that we have 
reasons to do an act and its negation—it is enough that we merely have any conflicting reasons—and does 
not rely on the assumption that we have no reason to torture a kitten—it is enough that there is at least one 
act that we can do that we have no reason to do. Though I leave the proof to a note, the result is this: Single 
Reason Closure and Consistent Reasons Agglomeration entail that if there is a reason for S to do a, there is a reason 
for S to do b, and S can’t do a and b, then there is a reason for S to do c for any c that S can do. 7 In other 
words, this results says that if reasons can conflict, then we have an explosion of reasons: for any act an agent 
can do, that agent has a reason to do that act. 
 This show that the initially tempting account of the cases is incorrect and some other account is 
needed. And there are many possible accounts of these cases. But before embarking on the task of 
                                               
7 Suppose there is a reason for S to do a and there is a reason for S to do b and  S cannot do a and b. Now doing b involves not doing 
a because S cannot do a and b, so by Single Reason Closure there is a reason for S to do not-a. And by another two application of Single 
Reason Closure, we get a reason to do a or c and a reason to do not-a or c for any c such that S can do c. Next notice that for any such c it 
must be that either S can do a and c or S can do not-a and c. 
 Suppose S can do a and c. This means S can do [[not-a or c] and a]. So by Consistent Reasons Agglomeration, we can generate a 
reason to do [[not-a or c] and a]. Finally since doing [[not-a or c] and a] involves doing c, we get the results by Single Reason Closure there 
is a reason to do c. 
 If we suppose instead that S can do not-a and c and start this time with the reason to do a or c, we get by analogous 
reasoning the result that there is a reason to do c. So either way there is a reason to do c for any c that S can do. This completes the 
proof. 
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considering all of these accounts, it is worth knowing that the problem that I just presented involving 
conflicting reasons has the same structure as a problem in deontic logic concerning conflicting ‘ought’s.8 The 
problem arises when trying to explain the above cases except replacing each occurrence of ‘reason’ with an 
occurrence ‘ought’ while also maintaining that ‘ought’s can conflict. 
 This structural similarity teaches us two important lessons. First, the problem in deontic logic is well-
studied. And deontic logicians have shown that the problem that we have just described is robust under a 
choice of a large variety of alternatives to the particular principles that we just looked at. That is, deontic 
logicians have looked at many principles other than the ‘ought’ analogs of Single Reason Closure and Consistent 
Reasons Agglomeration and shown that striking a balance between explaining our cases and avoiding something 
like the explosion problem is quite difficult. Indeed, in a recent survey article that is over one hundred pages 
long Lou Goble (2013) meticulously considers over twenty different packages of principles and illustrates the 
trade-offs they have between explaining our cases and avoiding explosion. 
 For this reason, I cannot catalog every twist and turn one could take to try to explain these cases (but 
n. 22 provides a rough guide to the different packages of principles that bear on our problem). I will simply 
leave it as a challenge to resolve this tension between explaining these cases and the platitude that reasons 
conflict. And a promising idea that I will end up making good on is that we can resolve it by mining the 
resources of the rich literature in deontic logic about the problem of conflicting ‘ought’s. Ultimately, this will 
mean that I will resolve this tension by continuing to accept Single Reason Closure, by rejecting Consistent Reasons 
Agglomeration, and by developing an alternative to it that still allows us to explain the cases that we need to 
explain. This may come as a surprise to some readers who find Single Reason Closure independently implausible 
and so see it as the obvious culprit in our problem. Appendix one addresses these readers’ worries. 
 The second thing to be learned by comparing our problem to the problem in deontic logic is that our 
problem is strictly more difficult than the problem in deontic logic. This is because one solution to the 
problem in deontic logic is to simply accept the ‘ought’ analogs of Single Reason Closure and Consistent Reasons 
Agglomeration and reject the assumption that ‘ought’s can conflict. If ‘ought’s never conflict, there is no harm 
in the trivially true claim that if ‘ought’s conflict, we get an explosion of ‘ought’s. Indeed, I will take it as a 
working assumption in this paper that ‘ought’s never conflict. But what is important to see is that the 
analogous solution to the problem concerning reasons is simply a non-starter for our problem. After all, it is a 
platitude that reasons can conflict.9 
                                               
8 For general discussion of the problem of conflicting obligations, see Brink 1994, Chellas 1980, Foot 1983, Gowans 1987b, Lemon 
1962, Marcus 1980, McConnell 2010, Pietroski 1993, Sinnott-Armstrong 1988, van Fraassen 1973, and Williams 1965. And see the 
helpful collection Gowans 1987a. For more recent discussion that bears particularly on the issues discussed in this section see Hansen 
2004, McNamara 2004, van der Torre and Tan 2000, and especially Goble 2009, 2013  and Horty 2003. 
9 Given my working assumption that ‘ought’s never conflict, we can, in fact, raise the first problem in a slightly different way. Almost 
everyone who accepts the popular idea in ethics accepts the following intuitively plausible connection between reasons and what we 
ought to do: 
 
‘Ought’s Entail Reasons: if S ought to do a, then there is a reason for S to do a 
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This then is the first problem: there is a tension between giving a systematic account of certain 
simple cases and the platitude that reasons conflict. As I said, my solution will be to accept Single Reason 
Closure and develop an alternative to Consistent Reasons Agglomeration that explains our cases and is informed by 
work in deontic logic. 
 
2. Conflicting Reasons and How Reasons Explain What We Ought to Do 
 But before I present my solution, we should consider a second problem. This problem is similar to 
one that John Horty and Lou Goble have discussed in earlier work.10 But the contribution of the problem 
that I will present is that it highlights a tension between three plausible ethical principles. We have already 
encountered the first two principles in passing: 
 
Reasons Allow Conflicts: there can be situations in which S has a reason to do a and a reason to 
do b but cannot do a and b 
 
‘Ought’s Cannot Conflicts: there cannot be situations in which S ought to do a and ought to do 
a but cannot do a and b 
 
As I said earlier, Reasons Allow Conflict is a platitude and we will be granting ‘Ought’s Cannot Conflicts for the sake 
of argument. 
The third principle that is involved in this tension is a claim about how reasons explain what we ought 
to do: 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
If we accept ‘Ought’s Entail Reasons, this means that there is a reason corresponding to each thing we ought to do. Now since we are 
assuming that ‘ought’s never conflict and since given this assumption, the ‘ought’ analogs of Single Reason Closure and Consistent Reasons 
Agglomeration: 
 
Single ‘Ought’ Closure:  if S ought to do a and doing a involves doing b, then S ought to do b 
Consistent ‘Ought’ Agglomeration: if S ought to do a, S ought to do b, and S can do a and b, then S ought to do a and 
b 
 
provide a simple explanation of the ‘ought’ analogs of Speeding Law  and Fighting or Serving, we may accept these two claims describing 
entailments among ‘ought’s. 
If we accept these entailments and accept ‘Ought’s Entail Reasons, we would need to ensure that there are reasons 
corresponding to each thing we ought to do that is generated by Single ‘Ought’ Closure and ‘Consistent ‘Ought’ Agglomeration. A natural 
question to ask the advocate of the popular idea in ethics who accepts 'Ought's Entail Reasons is what guarantees that there are reasons 
corresponding to each thing we ought to do that is generated by these entailments: what guarantees that reasons and what we ought to 
do walk in lock-step in the way that ‘Ought’s Entail Reasons requires? An elegant answer would be that the analogous entailments hold 
among reasons. That is, Single Reason Closure and Consistent Reasons Agglomeration hold. This then shows that there is a tension between 
providing a systematic the ‘ought’ analogs of Speeding Law and Fighting or Serving while preserving natural connections between ‘ought’s 
and reasons and the platitude that reasons conflict. 
10 Horty 2003: 572-573 was the first to notice the issue discussed in §3.1. But, as he presents it, the difficulty is narrowly tailored to the 
view in Brink 1994. Horty does not isolate the problem as one that arises from accepting the three principles discussed below. Horty 
also does not consider, as we will below, whether the view can be saved by supplementing it with principles concerning entailments 
among reasons. 
Goble 2013: 22 is the first to recognize the issue in §3.2 The contribution of my development of this difficulty is that it 
shows that the problem arises as a tension between the three ethical principle discussed below. Goble’s presentation focuses on 
validating so-called Standard Deontic Logic, delivering the disjunctive response, and explaining certain cases. My work is heavily 
indebted to Horty and Goble’s discussions. 
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Reasons Explain ‘Ought’s Directly: if S ought to do a, then this is in part (essentially) explained 
by the fact that there is a reason for S to do a11 
 
Philosophers who accept REASONS EXPLAIN ‘OUGHT’S are almost unanimous in their acceptance of Reasons 
Explain ‘Ought’s Directly.12, 13 While philosophers often discuss why they believe ‘ought’s are explained in terms 
of reasons, they rarely discuss why that explanation must validate Reasons Explain ‘Ought’s Directly. So 
unfortunately there is, to my knowledge, no argument in print in favor of Reasons Explain ‘Ought’s Directly. 
Perhaps this is because it seems obvious that accepting REASONS EXPLAIN ‘OUGHT’S  requires accepting 
Reasons Explain ‘Ought’s Directly. Or perhaps it is because it is hard to see what alternative there could be to 
accepting Reasons Explain ‘Ought’s Directly.  
But whatever the case maybe, it will be worthwhile to take a moment here to show that there is a 
certain kind of argument or motivation for Reasons Explain ‘Ought’s Directly that can be given. This will be 
worthwhile because the solution that I will offer involves rejecting Reasons Explain ‘Ought’s Directly. So it is 
important to have clearly in view ahead of time what can be said in favor of this principle that I will be 
committed to rejecting. 
The argument or motivation for Reasons Explain ‘Ought’s Directly can be introduced by comparing it to 
the following plausible theoretical principle which almost everyone who accepts REASONS EXPLAIN ‘OUGHT’S 
accepts: 
 
‘Ought’s Entail Reasons: if S ought to do a, then there is a reason for S to do a 
 
The difference between these two claims is this: ‘Ought’s Entail Reasons says that if you ought to do something, 
there is a reason to do that very thing.14 But it does not make any claims about explanation. Reasons Explain 
‘Ought’s Directly, on the other hand, makes the stronger claim that the reason is part of what explains why you 
ought to do it. 
Because Reasons Explain ‘Ought’s Directly is logically stronger than ‘Ought’s Explain Reasons, an advocate 
of REASONS EXPLAIN ‘OUGHT’S can explain why 'Ought's Entail Reasons holds by citing Reasons Explain 'Ought's 
                                               
11 The explanation may be partial because facts about other reasons and the strength of reasons may need to be mentioned. I The 
explanation is supposed to be essential in the sense that there is no complete explanation of why S ought to do a in terms of reasons 
that fails to mention the reason for S to do a. 
12 According to my usage, REASONS EXPLAIN ‘OUGHT’S and therefore Reasons Explain 'Ought's Directly assume that facts about reasons 
are prior to and explanatory of facts about what we ought to do So according to this usage, Broome 2004 does not accept the popular 
idea in ethics. This is because Broome explains the notion of a reason in terms of the prior notions of what we ought to do and a 
weighing explanation.  
13 For our purposes, certain variants of Reasons Explain 'Ought's Directly and 'Ought's Entail Reasons will do just as well. While it is 
difficult to provide a general statement of what the weakest commitment is that would still be sufficient for my argument that is not 
hopelessly abstract, it is important to know that those who favor revisions to simplistic formulation of REASONS EXPLAIN ‘OUGHT’S 
such as Bedke 2011, Dancy 2004b, Gert 2007, and Greenspan 2007 will be committed to variants of Reasons Explain 'Ought's Directly 
that will suffice for our problem. John Horty, Lou Goble, and Douglas Portmore are the only theorists that I know of who do not 
accept some such variant of Reasons Explain 'Ought's Directly. Horty also rejects 'Ought's Entail Reasons. Appendix two discusses their 
work. 
14 Of course, many philosophers who reject the popular idea in ethics also reject ‘Ought’s Entail Reasons. For example, Foot 1972 
famously rejects an analog of ‘Ought’s Entail Reasons that concerns what we morally ought to do (rather than what we ought to do all 
things considered; Foot’s stance on our version is not transparent). Similar comments apply to Reasons Explain ‘Ought’s Directly. 
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Directly. This is some evidence in favor of Reasons Explain 'Ought's Directly. What’s more, Reasons Explain 
'Ought's Directly can look like the only plausible explanation of 'Ought's Entail Reasons that an advocate of 
REASONS EXPLAIN ‘OUGHT’S can adopt as the following suggestive line of reasoning shows.15 
Consider how else an advocate of REASONS EXPLAIN ‘OUGHT’S explain the truth of 'Ought's Entail 
Reasons. One explanation of 'Ought's Entail Reasons is that anytime an agent ought to do a, the fact that she 
ought to do a explains why there is a reason for her to do a. If the fact that she ought to do a explains the 
reason to do a, then 'Ought's Entail Reasons would follow as a corollary. Unfortunately, this explanation looks 
to give up on REASONS EXPLAIN ‘OUGHT’S because it is an instance of an ‘ought’ explaining a reason. So 
someone who accepts REASONS EXPLAIN ‘OUGHT’S would not be able to explain 'Ought's Entail Reasons in this 
way. 
 Another possible explanation might go like this: What explains why an agent ought to do something 
is that it leads to the best outcome. What explains why an agent has a reason to do something is that it leads 
to an outcome that is better than another outcome in some respect. So if you ought to do a, then this must be 
because doing a has the best outcome. And if doing a has the best outcome, then doing a has an outcome 
that is better than another outcome in some respect. Thus, if you ought to do a, there must be a reason to do 
a. So 'Ought's Entail Reasons follows as a corollary of this view about the connection between what we ought to 
do, reasons, and goodness. 
 This explanation of the truth of 'Ought's Entail Reasons is problematic in two ways. First it is 
incompatible with  REASONS EXPLAIN ‘OUGHT’S because it denies that reasons explain ‘ought’s and instead 
says both reasons and what we ought to are explained by a third thing, values. 
Second even if we could modify this explanation of 'Ought's Entail Reasons so that it was consistent 
with REASONS EXPLAIN ‘OUGHT’S and only claimed that reasons (and not ‘ought’s) are explain in terms 
something else, e.g., values, it would nonetheless be a less than ideal explanation of 'Ought's Entail Reasons 
because it requires not just the resources of REASONS EXPLAIN ‘OUGHT’S but also a further theory of the 
nature of reasons. This would be less than ideal is not because such theories are false. Rather it is less than 
ideal because those who accept REASONS EXPLAIN ‘OUGHT’S have diverse commitments about which if any 
theory about the nature of reasons is correct. So I will set aside this approach in hopes of finding a more 
ecumenical solution to our problem. 
So far then we have considered two alternative explanations of 'Ought's Entail Reasons and found them 
unsatisfying. And it can seem like all the other explanations must be similarly unsatisfying as well. It can, at 
least at first glance, seem like the only alternative to explaining 'Ought's Entail Reasons in terms of Reasons 
Explain 'Ought's Directly is to either claim that what we ought to do explains what we have reason to do or rely 
                                               
15 I say this line of reasoning is suggestive because it makes a number of unstated assumptions about the nature of explanation and the 
space of options. Indeed, I end up rejecting one such assumption in giving my solution and so I am presenting this line of thought as 
foil for the solution that I will eventually offer. 
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on some further theory about the nature of what we ought to do and have reason to do. This leave us in the 
following situation: We can explain 'Ought's Entail Reasons with the help of Reasons Explain 'Ought's Directly. The 
only alternative explanations seem to involve giving up on REASONS EXPLAIN ‘OUGHT’S or relying on a 
further theory about the nature of reasons. Thus, Reasons Explain 'Ought's Directly looks to be the most 
plausible and ecumenical way for the advocate of  REASONS EXPLAIN ‘OUGHT’S to explain 'Ought's Entail 
Reasons. 
This, to my mind, is a powerful line of thought in Reasons Explain 'Ought's Directly’s favor. And it is 
one that was worth developing because my solution will require us to give up on Reasons Explain 'Ought's 
Directly and therefore face up to this argument in its favor. 
We have, then, the three elements of our second problem Reasons Can Conflict, 'Ought's Cannot Conflict, 
and Reasons Explain 'Ought's Directly. In the next section, I will show how there is a tension between these 
three theses. 
 
3. The Tension 
We can illustrate the tension between these principles by considering two cases. 
 
3.1 Two Breakfasts 
 The first case to consider is the following one: 
 
Two Breakfasts 
Mary promised Jeff that she would meet him downtown for breakfast. Mary also promised 
Scott that she would meet him by the beach for breakfast. These promises are equally 
important. Even though Mary can make it to either of the breakfasts, she can’t make it to 
both because downtown and the beach are too far apart. 
 
In Two Breakfasts, Mary’s promise to Jeff gives her a reason to meet Jeff downtown for breakfast and her 
promise to Scott gives her a reason to meet Scott by the beach for breakfast. Since she cannot do both, this 
means that her reasons conflict. Given Reasons Can Conflict, we should expect there to be cases involving 
conflicting reasons like Mary’s. And while Reasons Can Conflict doesn’t entail that there are cases involving 
equally good conflicting reasons, Two Breakfasts is plausibly such a case: since the promises that Mary made are 
equally important, plausibly the reasons that stem from them are equally important as well. Finally, we may 
also stipulate that Mary does not have any other reasons that conflict with keeping either promise. 
 Given that Mary’s reasons are equally good, what should she do? There seem to be only two 
plausible answers to this question. One answer is that Mary ought to meet Jeff for breakfast and Mary ought 
to meet Scott for breakfast. Unfortunately, this answer is ruled out by 'Ought's Cannot Conflict. Since Mary 
cannot go to both breakfasts, 'Ought's Cannot Conflict entails that it cannot be that she ought to go to each 
breakfast. 
 The only other plausible answer to our question about Mary’s case is that she ought to meet Scott for 
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breakfast or meet Jeff for breakfast.16 What Mary ought to do is this disjunctive act. To support this judgment, 
we can notice that we do not want to say that there is nothing Mary ought to do. If, for example, Mary chose 
to eat breakfast at home she would not be doing what she ought to be doing. But if Mary ought to do 
something and if it isn’t true that Mary ought to meet Jeff and ought to meet Scott, it looks like the only other 
candidate for what Mary ought to do is meet Jeff or Scott.17 
 Thus, we have seen that Reasons Can Conflict and 'Ought's Cannot Conflict commit us to thinking that in 
cases involving equally good conflicting reasons like Two Breakfasts, what agents like Mary ought to do is a 
disjunctive act like either meeting Jeff or meeting Scott. Now that we know this, we can ask how REASONS 
EXPLAIN ‘OUGHT’S can explain why we ought to to do a disjunctive act like meeting Jeff or Scott. And 
Reasons Explain 'Ought's Directly tells us that in order to explain why we ought to do a we need to at least show 
that there is a reason to do that very act, a. So if we are to explain why Mary ought to meet Jeff or Scott, we 
need to show that there is a reason for Mary to meet Jeff or Scott. 
 And maybe there is a reason to meet Jeff or Scott in Two Breakfasts. Maybe the promise to Jeff is a 
reason to do that. Or maybe her promises taken together are the reason. It is not important for our purposes 
to decide which of these claims is correct. 
What is important is to see is the general point that Two Breakfasts illustrates. It illustrates that in cases 
involving conflicting reasons, we need to provide some general principle that entails that there is a reason to 
do disjunctive acts like meeting Jeff or Scott. Two Breakfasts illustrates this general point because it was the 
structural feature of this case—that it involved conflicting equally good reasons—combined with our three 
theses—Reasons Can Conflict, 'Ought's Cannot Conflict, and Reasons Explain 'Ought's Directly—that led us to the 
result that we need to have a reason to do this disjunctive act. What this means is that unless we accept a 
general principle that entails that there are reasons to do disjunctive acts in cases involving conflicting reasons 
like Two Breakfasts, our three theses will be incompatible. 
So what principle might we use to get the right result in cases like Mary’s? We have already 
encountered one that looks promising, Single Reason Closure (which, recall, says that if there is a reason for S to 
do a and doing a involves doing b, then there is a reason to do b). As we saw, Single Reason Closure allows us to 
                                               
16 According to Horty 2003: 570-571, this so-called “disjunctive response” to cases like Mary’s was first explicitly stated in Donogan 
1984. It has since been endorsed by Brink 1994, Horty 2003 and Goble 2013. 
17 I have claimed that we do not want to say that Mary ought to do nothing. But one might object that it would be unfair to keep one 
promise rather than the other so Mary ought to keep neither and do nothing. I have three responses to this objection. First, though 
here is not the place to argue about first order issues in the theory of promises and fairness, I will simply report that I do not think it 
is unfair to keep one of the promises in this case. Second, insofar as we accept that it is unfair, the most natural way to capture this is 
to claim that there is a strong reason not to keep exactly one promise in this case. If we were to do that, then the case at hand would 
not be one of the structure that I intended it to be (one where there are only two relevant reasons and they are equally good but 
incompatible), but the objection would also would not undermine the structural claim that I am making. Third, consider a different 
case where the competition is not between two promises but between a promise and, e.g., harm to others, the agent’s own rational 
aims, or pleasure. Though people’s judgments about exactly which cases involving these kinds of reasons are ones where the reasons 
that are not worse than one another, people generally will agree that there are such cases. In such cases, I claim that the agent ought to 
perform the disjunctive act. And in such cases issues of fairness have no obvious role to play. Thanks to Nick Laskowski and an 
anonymous referee for pressing me on this point. 
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explain Speeding Law. And it also can similarly help explain Two Breakfasts. Since there is a reason to meet Jeff 
in this case and meeting Jeff involves meeting Jeff or Scott, Single Reason Closure tells us that there is the 
desired reason to meet Jeff or Scott.18 
 
3.2 Lunch-Coffee-Dinner 
 Unfortunately, Single Reason Closure alone won’t suffice to explain the full range of cases involving 
conflicting reasons. Consider for example the case of Sally: 
 
Lunch-Coffee-Dinner 
Sally has made three promises. She promised Tom that she will meet him for lunch 
downtown. She promised Jack that she will meet him for coffee by the beach. She promised 
Ann that she will meet her for dinner in Santa Barbara. While Sally can make it to lunch and 
coffee, can make it to lunch and dinner, and can make it to coffee and dinner, she cannot 
make it to lunch, coffee, and dinner. There just isn’t enough time for all that driving. 
 
In this case, Sally has a reason to meet Tom for lunch downtown, a reason to meet Jack for coffee by the 
beach, and a reason to meet Ann for dinner in Santa Barbara. While Sally can do any two of these things, she 
cannot do all three. As before, Reasons Can Conflict should lead us to expect that there are cases like Lunch-
Coffee-Dinner. And it is independently plausible that Lunch-Coffee-Dinner is one involving equally good 
conflicting reasons. 
 Given that Sally’s reasons are equally good, what should she do? One plausible answer is that Sally 
ought to meet Tom, ought to meet Jack, and ought to meet Ann. But presumably the spirit of 'Ought's Cannot 
Conflict tells us that just as pairs of ‘ought’s cannot conflict, sets of ‘ought’s cannot conflict either. 
 The only other plausible thing to say about this case is that Sally ought to perform the disjunctive act 
of meeting Tom and Jack or meeting Tom and Ann or meeting Jack and Ann. That is, Sally ought to perform 
this act that is a disjunction of conjunctions.19 And, recall, according to Reasons Explain 'Ought's Directly, to 
explain why we ought to do a we need a reason to do a itself. So to explain why Sally ought to do this 
disjunction of conjunctions we need to show that there is a reason to do this disjunction of conjunctions. 
 This means that we need our general principles to entail that such a reason exists in cases like Lunch-
Coffee-Dinner. Unfortunately, Single Reason Closure alone does not do this. If we apply Single Reason Closure to any 
of the individual reasons, the best we can do is generate a reason to meet Tom or meet Jack or meet Ann. But 
this is not the disjunction that we want. We want a disjunction of conjunctions. This is important because we 
want to be able to say that Sally ought to do at least two of the three acts and the simple disjunctions that 
Single Reason Closure gets us do not entail that there is a reason to do at least two of the three acts. Thus, Single 
                                               
18 This is of course not the only principle that could be used to tackle this case. One could instead adopt the principle that if there is a 
reason to do a and a reason to do b, then there is a reason to do a or b. As I said, I will not have the space here to discuss all the 
alternative principles that one might try because there are too many to discuss (but see n. 22 for a guide to what the issues with 
different families of principles are). My aim is to only present one solution to the problems developed in this paper. That said, it is 
worth noting that adopting this principle and rejecting Single Reason Closure would leave Speeding Law unexplained. 
19 Goble 2013: 22 concurs with this judgment about the case. 
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Reason Closure alone is not sufficient to solve our problem. 
Now if we were to have a reason to do two of the acts, Single Reason Closure would be enough to 
generate the reason to do the disjunction that we want. So the natural thing to do is adopt a principle that will 
allow us to generate a reason to do a pair of acts from the reasons to do each act. And we have already 
encountered such a principle, Consistent Reasons Agglomeration (which, recall, says that if there is a reason for S 
to do a, there is is a reason for S to do b, and S can do a and b, then there is a reason for S to do a and b.) 
With Consistent Reasons Agglomeration supplementing Single Reason Closure, we are in a position to explain Lunch-
Coffee-Dinner. Since there is a reason to meet Tom and a reason to meet Jack and since Sally can meet Tom 
and Jack, Consistent Reasons Agglomeration entails that there is a reason to meet Tom and Jack. We may then 
apply Single Reason Closure to the reason to meet Tom and Jack to generate the desired reason to meet Tom 
and Jack or meet Tom and Ann or meet Jack and Ann. Thus, Consistent Reasons Agglomeration and Single Reason 
Closure look to get us what we want. 
 But of course, as we know from the first problem, we cannot accept both Single Reason Closure and 
Consistent Reasons Agglomeration. They entail an explosion of reasons. So this is the second problem: In order to 
resolve the tension between Reasons Can Conflict, 'Ought's Cannot Conflict, and Reasons Explain 'Ought's Directly, 
we are led into the project of developing principles concerning the entailments among reasons. And once 
again, Single Reason Closure and Consistent Reasons Agglomeration initially look like promising candidates. But since 
they lead to an explosion of reasons, they are unacceptable. In order to solve this problem we need to 
develop alternatives to Single Reason Closure and Consistent Reasons Agglomeration that suffice to explain Two 
Breakfasts and Lunch-Coffee-Dinner but do not lead to explosion.  
 In light of these two problems concerning conflicting reasons, I conclude that there is work to be 
done to make sense of cases involving conflicting reasons if we accept  REASONS EXPLAIN ‘OUGHT’S. Having 
illustrated this, I turn to developing my own solution. 
 
4. Toward a Solution 
 As I have already said, there are many different principles that we could use to try to solve our two 
problems. But I will not pursue the project of canvassing the full range of these principles. Instead, since the 
problem of conflicting ‘ought’s is relatively well-known (in deontic logic at least), I begin by taking up the 
conjecture for solving the first problem that I mentioned earlier. The conjecture was that the solution to the 
first problem will have the same structure as solutions to the problem of conflicting ‘ought’s that allow for 
the existence of such ‘ought’s. I take up this conjecture in two stages. First I describe a certain structure 
shared by many solutions to the problem of conflicting ‘ought’s (§4.1). Second I turn to some familiar ideas in 
moral philosophy in order to adapt this structural feature to cases involving reasons (§4.2). 
 While this only directly tells us how to solve the first problem, I observe that it also indirectly 
suggests that the solution to the second problem is to deny Reasons Explain ‘Ought’s Directly (§4.3). §5 develops 
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these suggestions in greater detail and shows that they solve our problem. 
 
4.1 The Structure of Agglomeration 
The conjecture that we are pursuing is this: since our problem has the same structure as the problem 
of conflicting obligations in deontic logic, the literature in deontic logic might hold a solution. 
 Though I cannot discuss all of the details of this literature here, I can draw out, I believe for the first 
time, a certain structural similarity shared by many accounts developed in it. These accounts avoid explosion 
by denying the ‘ought’ analog of Consistent Reasons Agglomeration (Consistent ‘Ought’s Agglomeration: if S ought to 
do a, S ought to do b, and it is possible to do a and b then S ought to do a and b).20 But since Consistent ‘Ought’s 
Agglomeration had the virtue of  explaining cases like  Fighting or Serving, these accounts owe us some alternative 
treatment of this case if they are genuinely to solve the problem of conflicting ‘ought’s. And each of these 
accounts has its own distinct treatment of Fighting or Serving. 
For example, Paul McNamara (in his 2004) defines what we can all a ‘basically ought’ operator. The 
details of McNamara’s definition are too complex for us to discuss here, but these details will not be needed 
for us to appreciate the structure of his proposal. So let’s use the expression ‘basically ought’ to discuss these 
special ‘ought’s and continue to use ‘ought’ for ‘ought’s whether they are basic or not. McNamara’s idea then 
is that though Consistent ‘Ought’s Agglomeration does not hold, the following principle does: 
 
Consistent ‘Basically Ought’s Agglomeration: if S basically ought to do a, basically ought to do b, 
and S can do a and b, then S ought to do a and b. 
 
This allows McNamara to explain Fighting or Serving by claiming that in this case Smith basically ought to fight 
or serve and Smith basically ought to not fight. So by Consistent ‘Basically Ought’s Agglomeration, Smith ought to 
fight or serve and not fight. And then by ‘ought’ analog of Single Reason Closure (Single ‘Ought’ Closure) it follows 
that Smith ought to serve. 
 Importantly accepting Consistent ‘Basically Ought’s Agglomeration rather than Consistent ‘Ought’s 
Agglomeration allows McNamara to avoid the explosion result that we discussed earlier. This is because while 
McNamara accepts Single ‘Ought’ Closure and accepts that ‘basically ought’s entail ‘ought’s, he does not accept 
that a ‘basically ought’ to do a  entails a ‘basically ought’ to do b if doing a involves doing b. To see how this 
avoids the explosion problem, suppose that ‘basically ought’s conflict: 
 
(1) You basically ought to meet Sam for a drink 
 
(2) You basically ought not to meet Sam for a drink 
 
Since ‘basically ought’s are a kind of ‘ought’, we may apply Single ‘Ought’ Closure to (1) and generate: 
 
                                               
20 See Brown 1999; Hansen 2004; Horty 2003 and 2012; McNamara 2004, van der Torre and Tan 2000. 
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(3) You ought to [meet Sam for a drink or you torture a kitten] 
 
The next step in our derivation would be to use Consistent ‘Ought’s Agglomeration to derive the following claim 
from (2) and (3): 
 
(4) You ought to [[meet Sam for a drink or torture a kitten] and not meet Sam for a drink] 
 
But since we reject Consistent ‘Ought’s Agglomeration, this step is blocked. Now Consistent ‘Basically Ought’s 
Agglomeration would apply if (2) and (3) were claims about ‘basically ought’s. But since (3) is not a claim about 
‘basically ought’s and since we said that McNamara rejects the idea that a ‘basically ought’ to do a entails a 
‘basically ought’ to do b if doing a involves doing b, we cannot generate some ‘basically ought’ version of (3) 
from (1). Thus, McNamara is able to avoid this explosion result by blocking the move to (4). 
 It is a significant fact that McNamara’s solution is just one of a family of solutions that have this 
structure. Other theorists solve this problem in the same way except that they do not focus on ‘basically 
ought’s. Instead they discuss good reasons, phase-1 obligations, prima facie obligations, etc.21 All of these 
solutions to the problem do the same thing. Instead of accepting Consistent ‘Ought’s Agglomeration they accept 
something like Consistent ‘Basically Ought’s Agglomeration but replace ‘basically ought’s with good reasons,  
phase-1 obligations, prima facie obligations, etc. 
It is the structure of these proposals that allows them to solve the problem. They can explain (perhaps, 
with unequal plausibility) Smith’s case by saying that in that case Smith basically ought or has good reason or 
phase-1 ought or prima facie ought, etc. to fight or serve and Smith basically ought or has good reason or 
phase-1 ought or prima facie ought, etc. to not fight and show that it follows from this and their principles 
that Smith ought to serve. They can avoid explosion because in order to apply Consistent ‘Basically ought’s 
Agglomeration or a version of it that talks about good reasons, phase-1 obligations, prima facie obligations, etc. 
to get (4) we would need (3) to be a claim about ‘basically ought’s, good reasons, phase-1 obligations, prima 
facie obligations, etc. But each of these views denies that we can use Single ‘Ought’ Closure on (1) to generate 
such a claim. Thus, it is the shared structure of these views that allows them explain to Smith’s case while 
avoiding explosion. It is no coincidence, then, that so many deontic logicians have converged on this 
structure despite the fact that these logicians have approached the problem of conflicting ‘ought’s from very 
different theoretical perspectives.22 
                                               
21 Horty 2012 discusses good reason, van der Torre and Tan 2000 discusses phase-1 obligations, Horty 2003 discusses prima facie 
obligations. Brown 1999 and Hansen 2004 make similar distinctions. 
22 There are four kinds of views about conflicting ‘ought’s that do not have this structure. First Goble 2009 solves the problem of 
conflicting ‘ought’s by modifying Single ‘Ought’ Closure. We should not go in for this as a solution to our problem because Goble’s 
modification would not allow us to generate the required reasons in Two Breakfasts. Second others accept something like Single ‘Ought’ 
Closure and Consistent ‘Ought’ Agglomeration but go on to deny the derivation of explosion (see, e.g., Beirlaen, Straßer, Meheus 2013). 
Though these solutions are  plausible as theories of reasoning, I believe they are not adequate for dealing with (necessary) entailments 
among reasons because they give up on certain structural properties of logical consequence (see Nair 2014 for discussion). Third some 
views either fail to avoid explosion or fail to give any account of the cases that motivate our principles, for a comprehensive survey 
see Goble 2013. Thus, these three kinds of views cannot solve our problem. Finally, I have recently learned of a fourth kind of view 
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 Since numerous deontic logicians have converged on this structure as a solution to the problem of 
conflicting obligations and since our problem has the same structure as this problem, a promising idea is that 
we can get a solution to our problem by taking advantage of this structure. What this means is that we should 
hold on to Single Reason Closure and reject Consistent Reasons Agglomeration. And we should develop some 
reasons-analog to Consistent ‘Basically Ought’s Agglomeration. 
 
4.2 Non-Derivative CRA 
This insight will help us solve our problem only if we can determine what to use as an analog of 
‘basically ought’s in our principle. To answer this question, I turn to a familiar distinction in ethics. 
 The familiar distinction is the distinction between things that are intrinsically, or in my preferred 
terminology, non-derivatively good and things that are relationally or, in my terminology, derivatively good. 
Things that are derivatively good are good in virtue of standing in some important relation to other things 
that are good. Things that are non-derivatively good, on the other hand, are good but not in virtue of 
standing in some important relation to other things that are good. So for example, we might think that 
pleasure is non-derivatively good. And since pleasure is non-derivatively good, it may be that eating ice cream 
is derivatively good because it stands in an important relation to the non-derivative good of pleasure; it causes 
it. So causal relations count as one of the important relations that something can stand to something else that 
is good in order to count as being derivatively good. 
But we should leave it open whether there are other important relations.23 For example, a Kantian 
might believe that the only thing that is non-derivatively good is the good will but claim other things are 
derivatively good in virtue of standing in intentional relations to the good will. More generally, we should 
leave it open exactly which relations are the ones that are capable of making something derivatively good.24 
 This familiar distinction in moral philosophy is important for two reasons. First, it allows theorists 
can settle questions about what is good in two stages. First they decide what the non-derivative goods are. 
Then they give an account of relations to non-derivative goods that explains the existence of derivative goods. 
Together, these claims provide an account of what all the good things are in the ordinary non-theoretical 
sense; the primary data theories of goodness attempt to explain are what the good things are in this non-
theoretical sense of ‘good’. 
Second this distinction allows theorists to capture certain subtle properties of good things that would 
otherwise be missed. For example, pleasure is good and eating ice cream is good but these goods have 
different modal profiles. Pleasure is necessarily good but eating ice cream is contingently good. This 
distinction is explained by the fact that pleasure is a non-derivative good, the fact that eating ice cream is a 
                                                                                                                                                       
being developed in work in progress by Lou Goble. This view involves a radical departure from Single ‘Ought’ Closure, but has other 
features that may allow it to solve our problem. Unfortunately, I do not have the space here to discuss the prospects of this proposal. 
23 Cf. Kagan 1998, Korsgaard 1983. 
24 To say that something is non-derivatively good is to say that its goodness is not explained by something else being good. This does 
not rule out that it can be explained in terms of some other normative or non-normative notion. 
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derivative good, and the relation it needs to stand to pleasure to be good is a contingent one. Thus, tis 
distinction allows us to make perspicuous the explanatory structure of our theories and explain certain 
features of the things that we want to explain that we would otherwise miss. 
Now that we have introduced this distinction between derivative and non-derivative and seen what is 
important about it by talking about goodness, we can apply it to other normative notions. We can then help 
ourselves to a distinction between derivative and non-derivative reasons as well as a distinction between 
derivative and non-derivative ‘ought’s.25 So from now on, let’s explicitly write ‘non-derivative reason’ and 
‘derivative reason’ to discuss non-derivative reasons and derivative reasons respectively and use ‘reason’ 
without a modifier before it to discuss reasons without making a claim about whether they are derivative or 
not. Similarly, for ‘ought’s. 
 And let’s use this distinction in our reasons-analog of Consistent ‘Basically Ought’s Agglomeration. In 
particular, the principle is the following: 
 
Consistent Non-Derivative Reasons Agglomeration: if there is a non-derivative reason for S to do a, a 
non-derivative reason for S to do b, and S can do a and b, then there is a derivative reason to 
do a and b26 
 
Consistent Non-Derivative Reasons Agglomerations says that there is a derivative reason to do a and b because doing 
a and b stands in an important relation to what there are non-derivative reasons to do: Just as the distinction 
between derivative and non-derivative goods allows us to explain the different features of goods like pleasure 
and ice cream (their different modal profiles), the distinction between derivative and non-derivative reasons 
allows us to explain different features of certain reasons. In particular, the distinction together with Consistent 
Non-Derivative Reasons Agglomeration tells us exactly which reasons give rises to reasons to do a conjunction and 
which reasons do not. 
In short, the proposal is that we can explain why there are certain derivative reasons by showing that 
these derivative reasons stand in an important relation to non-derivative reasons.  Since Consistent Non-
Derivative Reasons Agglomeration is structurally analogous to Consistent ‘Basically Ought’s Agglomeration and since 
this structure is one that deontic logicians have used to approach the problem, this suggests that adopting this 
principle will solve our first problem.27 We will look at this in detail in §5. But before that, I want to make a 
                                               
25 Cf. Parfit 2011: vol. 1 39,  Väyrynen 2011: 190 and n. 20. 
26 Two comments may be in order. First, the exact analog of Consistent ‘Basically Ought’s Agglomeration would not say ‘there is a derivative 
reason’ in the consequent but would merely say  ‘there is a reason (perhaps derivative, perhaps non-derivative)’. So the principle given 
in the text is strictly stronger than the exact analog of Consistent ‘Basically Ought’s Agglomeration. But this stronger principle is plausible 
and also solves our problem. Indeed, I accept the even stronger claim that says the non-derivative reasons explain the derivative 
reasons. 
 Second, there are complications that arise from the fact that I am only focusing on there being reasons to do acts in this 
paper and not discussing what those reasons are. In particular, there can be cases in which there is a derivative reasons as well as a 
non-derivative reason to do an act where these reasons are provided by different facts. While the ideas I develop below are compatible 
with this, they do not provide as clear verdicts about these cases. However, a generalization of the model in appendix two that I 
develop in work in progress can provide a clear treatment of these cases. 
27 The derivative/non-derivative distinction also allows us to notice a more restricted version of Reasons Explain ‘Ought’s Directly that 
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final observation that will suggest a promising solution to the second problem as well. 
 
4.3 Rejecting Reasons Explain ‘Ought’s Directly 
 The observation concerns how we might be able to accept  REASONS EXPLAIN ‘OUGHT’S without 
accepting Reasons Explain ‘Ought’s Directly: just as we can explain derivative reasons by showing that what we 
have a derivative reason to do is that which stands in an important relation to our non-derivative reasons, we 
might analogously explain what we ought to do by showing that what we ought to do is that which stands in 
an important relation to our non-derivative reasons. Of course, we have not yet identified the exact 
relationship involved in explaining ‘ought’s. Nonetheless, this is enough to see, abstractly at least, that Reasons 
Explain ‘Ought’s Directly might not be the only way that reasons could explain ‘ought’s. This suggests that we 
can straightforwardly resolve the tension between Reasons Can Conflict and ‘Ought’s Cannot Conflict on one hand 
and Reasons Explain ‘Ought’s Directly on the other by siding with Reasons Can Conflict and ‘Ought’s Cannot Conflict 
and rejecting Reasons Explain ‘Ought’s Directly. 
Of course, we also thought Reasons Explain ‘Ought’s Directly was appealing because it looked like the 
most promising explanation of ‘Ought’s Entail Reasons (which, recall, says that if you ought to do a, then there 
is a reason for you to do a).  But what makes the idea that we are considering so promising is that it shows 
that Reasons Explain ‘Ought’s Directly might not be the only ecumenical explanation of ‘Ought’s Entail Reasons 
that is compatible with REASONS EXPLAIN ‘OUGHT’S. Instead, if non-derivative reasons explain ‘ought’s as 
well as derivative reasons, we might be able to explain ‘Ought’s Entail Reasons without accepting Reasons Explain 
‘Ought’s Directly. ‘Ought’s Entail Reasons would be true because ‘ought’s and derivative reasons have a “common 
cause”: non-derivative reasons. 
In the next section, I describe the solution suggested by our discussion in this section in greater detail 
and show how it solves our problem. 
 
5. The Solution 
 The idea that is suggested by the observations of the last section is that distinguishing between 
derivative reasons and non-derivative reasons will be useful in two ways. First, the distinction will allow us to 
develop a principle of agglomeration (namely, Consistent Non-Derivative Reasons Agglomeration) that explains our 
                                                                                                                                                       
would suffice for our second problem: 
 
Reasons Explain ‘Non-Derivatvie Ought’s Directly: If an agent non-derivatively ought to do a, then this is in part 
because the agent has a non-derivative reason to do a. 
 
We can see that the problem arises even if we assume only Reasons Explain ‘Non-Derivative Ought’s Directly’ rather than Reasons Explain 
‘Ought’s Directly. This is because what Mary and Sally non-derivatively ought to do are those disjunctive acts. This ‘ought’ is not 
explained by some other ‘ought’. 
Though I do not have the space to discuss the details here, the fact that our problem arises even only assuming Reasons 
Explain ‘Non-Derivative Ought’s Directly distinguishes it from superficially similar problems concerning instrumental reasons and ‘ought’s. 
See Bedke 2009, Raz 2005, Schroeder 2009, and especially Kolodny Forthcoming and Millsap ms for discussion of instrumental 
reasons. 
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cases and avoids explosion. Second the distinction will allow us to explain both derivative reasons and what 
we ought to do in terms of non-derivative reasons. This second point is important because it opens the door 
to there being cases where you ought to do so something and have a reason to do it, but that reason does not 
partially explain why you ought to do it. Instead, there can be cases where you ought to do some act and 
merely have a derivative reason to do that act and in these cases, both what you ought to do and what you 
have (derivative) reason to do is explain by having a non-derivative reason to do some (other) act. 
 In this section, we will develop these ideas in enough detail to show that they really do solve our 
problem. Appendix two provides a simple formal model of these ideas that allows us to formally check this 
solution. 
 
5.1 The Theory 
 Let me now describe how non-derivative reasons explain derivative reasons as well as what we ought 
to do. 
 Roughly, my idea is that given a collection of non-derivative reasons, we have a derivative reason to 
do anything that is involved in doing what there are non-derivative reasons to do. For example, suppose I 
have non-derivative reason to give comments on my friend’s paper (e.g., because I promised her that I would) 
and suppose I have non-derivative reason to meet a different friend for lunch (e.g., because I promised this 
other friend that I would). In this case doing what I have non-derivative reasons to do involves both giving 
comments and going to lunch. So in this case, I have a derivative reason to both give comments and go to 
lunch—there is a derivative reason to do this conjunction in virtue of the fact that there is a non-derivative 
reason to do each conjunct and doing conjuncts involves doing the conjunction. 
 Now this is only roughly my idea because non-derivative reasons can conflict. For example, it may be 
that there is a non-derivative reason to go to the store and a non-derivative reason to not go to the store. 
Perhaps, there are these reasons because I have made conflicting promises. In this case, I do not wish to 
claim that there is a derivative reason to do the impossible act of both going and not going to the store. 
 In order to avoid this problem, my proposal is this: what we have a derivative reason to do is 
anything that is involved in doing some most inclusive collection of acts such that (i) we have non-derivative 
reason to do each act in that collection and (ii) it is possible to do all the acts in the collection together. For 
short, I will say that we have a derivative reason to do what is involved in doing some most inclusive 
compossible set of acts that we have non-derivative reasons to do. 
Let me illustrate how this account works. Suppose I have a non-derivative reason to go to the store, a 
non-derivative reason to not go to the store, and a non-derivative reason to go the dry cleaners. In this case, 
there are three acts that I have a non-derivative reason to do: go to the store, not go to the store, and go to 
the dry cleaner. Suppose that I can [go to the store and go to the dry cleaner] and can [refrain from going to 
the store and go to the dry cleaner].  Of course, I cannot [go to the store and not go to the store] and I 
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cannot [go to the store, not go to the store, and go to the dry cleaner]. So these collections of acts are not 
compossible. 
In this case then, there are two most inclusive collections of compossible acts that I have non-
derivative reasons to do. One consists of the act of going to the store and the act of going to the dry cleaner; 
the other of the act of not going to the store and the act of going to the dry cleaner. The (singleton) collection 
consisting of just going to the store is not a most inclusive collection because there are other acts (e.g., going to 
the dry cleaner) that we could add to that collection and still have a collection of compossible acts that there 
are non-derivative reasons to do. Similar remarks apply to the collection just consisting of not going to the 
store and the collection just consisting of going to the dry cleaners. 
 So according to my account, you have a derivative reason to do anything that is involved in doing the 
collection of acts consisting of going to the store and going to the dry cleaner and you have a derivative 
reason to do anything that is involved in doing the collection of acts consisting of not going to the store and 
going to the dry cleaner. For example, then, you have a derivative reason to go to the store and the dry 
cleaner and you have a derivative reason to not go to the store and the dry cleaner. 
 This same basic idea can be extended to deal with what we ought to do with two tweaks. First, what 
we ought to do does not depend on any old non-derivative reasons. For example, sometimes you might have 
much stronger non-derivative reason to do a than to do b where you can’t do a and b. In this case, you ought 
to do a. So the first tweak will be to focus not on all the non-derivative reasons but the subset of those non-
derivative reasons that are undefeated in the sense that you have an undefeated non-derivative reason to do a 
just in case there is no act incompatible with doing a that you have a better non-derivative reason to do.28 So 
far then, the tweak to our account of derivative reasons would give us this: what we ought to do is anything 
that is involved in doing some most inclusive collection of compossible acts that we have undefeated non-
derivative reasons to do. 
 Another tweak that is needed is that we should focus on what is involved in doing any collection of 
acts of the relevant sort rather than what is involved in doing some collection. The reason why we should do 
this is that we are assuming ‘Ought’s Cannot Conflict holds. Let me explain. 
 Suppose I have made two equally important promises one to go to the store, the other to meet Tom 
for lunch. And suppose in this case I cannot both go to the store and meet Tom for lunch. In this case each 
of these reason is undefeated because, we may suppose, you have no relevant reason to do anything else and 
the reasons are equally strong because the promises are equally important. If we were to say that what we 
ought to do is what follows from some most inclusive set of compossible acts that we have undefeated non-
derivative reasons to do, we would get the result that I ought to go to the store and that I ought to meet Tom 
for lunch even though I cannot do both of these. This is because the collection consisting solely of going to 
                                               
28  See appendix two for some details about how the collection of undefeated non-derivative reasons is determined and some 
complications associated with this issue. 
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the store is a most inclusive compossible collection of acts that I have non-derivative reasons to do; similarly 
for the collection consisting solely of  meeting Tom for lunch. 
 To avoid this result, we should say that what we ought to do is any act that is involved in doing any 
most inclusive collection of acts of the relevant sort. In this case, going to the store is not involved in doing 
any most inclusive collection of acts of the relevant sort and neither is meeting Tom for lunch. However, 
either meeting Tom for lunch or going to the store is involved in doing any most inclusive set of act. Thus, 
we get the correct result that you ought to meet Tom for lunch or go to the store. 
To summarize then, we have an account of derivative reasons and what we ought to do in terms of 
non-derivative reasons. The account of derivative reasons is this: 
  
There is a derivative reason for S to do a just in case and because doing a is involved in 
doing some most inclusive collection of acts such that (i) there are non-derivative reasons 
for S to do each act in that collection and (ii) it is possible for S to do all the acts in the 
collection together. 
 
The account of what we ought to do is this: 
 
S ought to do a just in case and because doing a  is involved in doing any most inclusive 
collection of acts such that (i) there are undefeated non-derivative reasons for S to do each act 
in that collection and (ii) it is possible for S to do all the acts in the collection together. 
 
To adopt one way of thinking about the kinds of explanations involved in normative theorizing, we can say 
that this account says facts about derivative reasons are complex facts about non-derivative reasons and 
relations of involvement among acts. And similarly, facts about what we ought to do are complex facts about 
(undefeated) non-derivative reasons and relations of involvement among acts. 
 The explanatory structure, then, of the theory has non-derivative reasons as basic and uses the fact 
that certain acts involve doing other acts together with non-derivative reasons to explain derivative reasons 
and what we ought to do. In this sense, non-derivative reasons function as a “common cause” of both 
derivative reasons and what we ought to do. 
There is however a different explanatory structure that may have become apparent at this point. This 
is a structure in which the non-derivative reasons explain the derivative reasons and then derivative reasons 
explain what we ought to do. There are two comments to make about this alternative. 
First, this alternative explanatory structure is strictly stronger than the one that I have offered. This is 
because while it is generally thought that if A explain B and B explains C, then A explains C, it is not generally 
thought that if A explains B and A explains C, then A explains B and B explains C. So the alternative 
explanatory structure entails my explanatory structure but not vice-versa. It is interesting fact that we need 
not adopt the more committal explanatory structure to solve our problem. 
 Second, it is not obvious absent further explanation why the stronger structure is correct for two 
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reasons. First, the stronger explanation requires us to spell out the details of how what we ought to do can be 
explained in terms of derivative reasons. And this turns out to be surprisingly difficult for reasons that I 
sketch in a note.29 Second, and more importantly, even if this can be done the explanation of what we ought 
to do can be give without referencing these complications. I have just stated how it may be done. For this 
reason, the appeal to derivative reasons is in no way essential to explaining what we ought to do. 
Because of this, my preferred way of viewing things is this: non-derivative reasons explain both 
derivative reasons and what we ought to do. Necessary connections between derivative reasons and what we 
ought to do are epiphenomenal in the sense that they do not arise directly because of explanatory connections 
between derivative reasons and what we ought to do. Rather they arise because of the fact that derivative 
reasons and what we ought to do are both explained by what we have non-derivative reason to do and 
involvement relations among actions. 
 With these clarifications in mind, let me now illustrate how this account solves our problem. 
 
5.2. The Solution 
 We will begin by verifying that the account on offer captures the principles that we discussed and 
then turn to how each of the cases will be treated. 
5.2.1 The Principles 
 I said that the package of principles that would avoid explosion are Single Reason Closure and Consistent 
Non-Derivative Reasons Agglomeration. Let us first verify that we avoid explosion and the see that this is precisely 
because we accept these principles. 
 The explosion result said that we have a reason to do a and a reason to do b and can’t do both, then 
there is a reason to do any c such that we can do c. Here is a simple counterexample that shows that we do 
not get this result whether we are discussing derivative or non-derivative reasons. Suppose there is a reason to 
go to the store (perhaps a derivative reason or perhaps a non-derivative reason) and a reason to not go to the 
store (perhaps a derivative reason or perhaps not a derivative reason). Now one thing that I can do is throw 
my laptop on the floor right now. Let us consider then whether we get the result that I must have a reason to 
                                               
29 In order to explain why we ought to do a in terms of reasons to do a, we must be able to say something about how the strength of 
derivative reasons is determined. It is in fact easy enough to say when there is decisive derivative reason to do a: there is a decisive 
derivative reason to do a just in case doing a is involved in doing any most inclusive compossible collection of acts that there is 
undefeated non-derivative reason to do. That said, whether a reasons is derivative is determined by whether the reasons for doing 
something are better than the reasons against doing this. So to actually vindicate this definition, I take it, we must be able to say in 
general when one derivative reason is stronger than the other and show that the definition of a decisive reason can be recovered as the 
special case of the reasons to do a being better than the reasons to do any alternative. This task is one that no one to my knowledge 
has accomplished. In work in progress, I show how this can be done with some considerable complication. But while the possibility 
of doing this is interesting, I do not believe that it shows that ‘ought’s are explained in the way the alternative explanatory structure 
suggests. This is because the explanation directly in terms of non-derivative reasons is considerably simpler and more elegant. 
Now the alternative explanatory structure may seem more attractive because it vindicated Reasons Explain ‘Ought’s Directly. 
But there are two points to be made about this. First, I do not believe that Reasons Explain ‘Ought’s Directly is a principle that there is 
independent reason to capture even though many theorists accept it. This is why I developed a motivation for it based on ‘Ought’s 
Entail Reasons. Second, as I am understanding Reasons Explain ‘Ought’s Directly, it claims that the reason to do a is an essential component 
of an explanation of why we ought to a in terms of reasons. This proposal does not vindicate that idea as I explain in the main text. 
Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this issue. 
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throw my laptop on the floor now. 
We can look at a few different cases. First, suppose I have a non-derivative reason to go to the store 
and a non-derivative reason to not go to the store. In this case, I do not have a reason (derivative or 
otherwise) to throw my laptop on the floor because throwing my laptop on the floor is not involved in going 
to the store and is not involved in not going to the store. Second suppose I have derivative reason to go to 
the store because it is involved in buying vegetables and suppose I have derivative reason to not go the store 
because it is involved in caring for my sick child. In this case too, there is no reason (derivative or otherwise) 
to throw my laptop on the floor because throwing my laptop on the floor is not involved in buying vegetables 
and it is not involved in caring for my sick child. 
 Of course, it can be that I have a reason to throw my laptop on the ground when I also have a reason 
to go the store and a reason to not go to the store. But this will only be true in cases where throwing my 
laptop on the ground is involved in doing some compossible collection of things that I have non-derivative 
reasons to do. And in these cases, there is no problem with this result. The explosion result is problematic 
because it gives rise to things that there is a reason for you to do that have no bearing whatsoever on what 
other things that you have reasons to do. My account does not do this. 
 And as I said, the account does this by accepting Single Reason Closure and Consistent Non-Derivative 
Reasons Agglomeration. Single Reason Closure says this: 
 
if there is a reason for S to do a and doing a involves doing b, then there is a reason for S to do 
b 
 
To see that my account validates this principle, suppose that there is a reason for S to do a. Now this reason 
may be derivative or not. If it is non-derivative, then there must be a reason to do b because you have a 
derivative reason to do anything that is involved in doing some most inclusive compossible set of actions that 
you have non-derivative reasons to do. Since a will be part of some such collection and since doing a involves 
doing b, it follows that there is a derivative reason and so a reason to do b. Suppose instead that there is a 
derivative reason to do a, then there must be a reason to do b as well because, by the transitivity of involving, 
if a is involved in doing some most inclusive compossible collection of acts that you have non-derivative 
reasons to do and if doing a involves doing b, b is involved in doing that most inclusive compossible 
collection of acts.  
 Next consider Consistent Non-Derivative Reasons Agglomeration: 
 
if there is a non-derivative reason for S to do a and there is a non-derivative reason for S to 
do b, and S can do a and b, then there is a derivative reason for S to do a and b. 
 
To see that this holds suppose there is a non-derivative reason to do a, a non-derivative reason to do b, and 
you can do a and b. In this case, a and b both will be part of a particular most inclusive collection of 
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compossible acts that you have non-derivative reasons to do. Since doing any such collection involves doing a 
and b, it follows that there is a derivative reason to do a and b. 
 Notice here that Consistent Reasons Agglomeration does not hold. There can be cases where there is a 
reason to do a and a reason to do b and you can do a and b even though there is no reason to do a and b. 
Suppose for example you have a non-derivative reason to do [a and c] and a non-derivative reason to do [b 
and not-c]. In this case, there are two most inclusive compossible collections of acts that you have non-
derivative reason to do. The first contains the conjunctive act of doing a and c; the second the conjunctive act 
of doing b and not-c. In this case, there is a reason to do a because it is involved in doing the first collection 
and there is a reason to do b because it is involved in doing the second collection, but there is no reason to do 
a and b because it is not involved in doing either collection. 
 Next notice that Reasons Can Conflict and ‘Ought’s Cannot Conflict both hold. Reasons Can Conflict holds 
because we allow non-derivative reasons to conflict and set things up to allow derivative reasons to conflict as 
well. We also ensured that ‘Ought’s Cannot Conflict holds by focusing on what follows from any most inclusive 
compossible collection of acts that there are undefeated non-derivative reasons to do. 
 Finally turn to Reasons Explain ‘Ought’s Directly. To see this need not hold, consider Two Breakfasts. 
There Mary promised to meet Jeff downtown and Scott by the beach. Plausible, there is a non-derivative 
reason to meet Jeff and a non-derivative reason to meet Scott and they are each undefeated. In this case, what 
explains why Mary ought to either meet Jeff or Scott on my view is that this follows from each collection of 
most inclusive compossible acts that there are undefeated non-derivative reasons to do. Now since neither 
collection contains a non-derivative reason to [meet Jeff or Scott], Reasons Explain ‘Ought’s Directly does not 
hold in this case. 
 It is still nonetheless true that there is such a reason to meet Jeff or Scott. And this is because this 
reason is derivative has those same non-derivative reasons as a “common cause”. The reason to meet Jeff or 
Scott is derivative and arises from the fact that it follows from some most inclusive compossible set of non-
derivative reasons. 
More generally, even though Reasons Explains ‘Ought’s Direct does not hold ‘Ought’s Entail Reasons does 
hold. This is because if doing a is involved in doing any most inclusive collection of compossible acts that 
there are undefeated non-derivative reasons to do, doing a is also involved in doing some most inclusive 
collection of compossible acts that there are non-derivative reasons to do. 
 This shows then that the account developed here accepts the exact set of principles that I have 
claimed will avoid our problem.  
5.2.2 Cases 
 I now turn to the cases that we have discussed. There are four. 
First begin by considering Speeding Law. We want to show that there must be a reason to drive less 
than one hundred miles per hour given that there is a reason to drive less than one hundred miler per hour. 
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And as we know, Single Reason Closure is enough to explain this case and my account accepts Single Reason 
Closure. 
 Two Breakfasts was already discussed in §5.2.1. I showed that we get the desired result that I ought to 
meet Jeff or Scott and that there is a reason for me to meet Jeff or Scott. 
 Third consider Lunch-Coffee-Dinner: 
 
Sally has made three promises. She promised Tom that she will meet him for lunch 
downtown. She promised Jack that she will meet him for coffee by the beach. She promised 
Ann that she will meet her for dinner in Santa Barbara. While Sally can make it to lunch and 
coffee, can make it to lunch and dinner, and can make it to coffee and dinner, she cannot 
make it to lunch, coffee, and dinner. There just isn’t enough time for all that driving. 
 
Here we have three non-derivative reasons that are equally good. 30  In this case, the acts are pairwise 
compossible but setwise imcompossible. So there are three most inclusive compossible collections of acts 
that there are undefeated non-derivative reasons to do. The first collection consists of the act of going to 
lunch and the act of going to coffee; the second the act of going to lunch and the act of going to dinner; third 
the act of going to coffee and the act of going to dinner. Doing any of these collections of acts involves doing 
the disjunction of conjunctions: going to lunch and coffee or going to lunch and dinner or going to coffee 
and dinner. Thus, in this case there is a derivative reason to do this and this ought to be done. 
 Fourth and finally consider Fighting our Serving: 
 
Smith’s country requires him to fight in the army or perform alternative public service. We 
may suppose then that Smith has a reason to fight in the army or perform alternative public 
service. Smith is also deeply committed to a pacifist religion that requires him not fight in the 
army. We may suppose then that Smith has a reason to not to fight in the army. Given that 
Smith has a reason to fight or serve and given that Smith has a reason to not to fight, Smith 
also has a reason to serve. 
 
If we assume there is non-derivative reason to fight or serve and non-derivative reasons to not fight, we get 
the right result in this case. Since these are the only reasons in this case and you can do both of these things, 
they form a most inclusive compossible collection of acts that there is undefeated reason to do. Since serving 
is involved in fighting or serving and not fighting, it follows by our account that there is a reason to serve and 
that you ought to serve. 
                                               
30 Since it is an open question in moral philosophy what the non-derivative reasons are, what entitles me to make the assumption each 
promise provides a non-derivative reason? I make these assumptions for simplicity. Many other assumptions but not all assumptions 
would work. All that can be done to answer suspicion about my solution on this score is to consider alternative proposals on a case-
by-case basis. 
For example, the alternative view that we have non-derivative reason to keep as many promises as we can or that we have 
non-derivative reason to minimize promise-breaking would work for my purposes But the idea that we only have non-derivative 
reason to keep all of our promises would not. 
This is the right result. If the only thing that we have non-derivative reason to do is keep all of our promises and we can’t 
keep all of our promises, then it is not the case that we ought to keep two of three promises. Indeed, this consequence of my view 
shows just what is so implausible about this view of the normative significance of promises. 
 Similar comments apply to Fighting or Serving. Thus, though I cannot prove this, I believe my view will get the right results in 
these cases. 
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6. Conclusion 
 In this paper, I have argued that two related problems show that it is difficult to make sense of cases 
involving conflicting reasons if we accept  REASONS EXPLAIN ‘OUGHT’S. I then developed a unified solution 
to these problems. An important upshot of this solution is that the distinction from moral philosophy 
between derivative and non-derivative reasons and work in deontic logic on conflicting ‘ought’s are important 
to the project of understanding how reasons explain ‘ought’s. It was these ideas that allowed us to clearly 
appreciate the structure of our problem. And it was these ideas that led to the central thought behind my 
solution: what there is a derivative reason to do and what we are ought to do is that which stands in an 
important relation to what there are non-derivative reasons to do. If reasons explain ‘ought’s, then this is, at 
least to first approximation, how they explain them.31 
  
                                               
31 For helpful comments thanks to the audience of the USC speculative society, Tony Anderson, Josh Crabill, Steve Finlay, Lou Goble, 
Keith Hall, Matthew Hanser, Ben Lennertz, Alida Liberman, Nick Laskowski, Errol Lord, Doug Portmore, Indrek Reiland, Henry 
Richardson, Jacob Ross, Barry Schein, Sam Shpall, Justin Snedegar, Julia Staffel, Sigrún Svavarsdóttir, Gabriel Uzquiano-Cruz, Ryan 
Walsh, Aness Webster, Ralph Wedgwood, Aaron Zimmerman, and especially two anonymous referees at Philosophical Studies. Thanks 
most of all to Mark Schroeder for advice and criticism on every issue at every stage of this project. Finally, I thank the USC Provost’s 
PhD Fellowship and Russell Fellowship for support. 
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A.1  The Life of Single Reason Closure 
 In my experience, Single Reason Closure is a principle that some people find highly suspect. This 
appendix is dedicated to briefly discussing the status of this principle.32 
I should start by admitting that it is unlikely that what I can say in this paper that is not directly 
dedicated to considering all aspects of Single Reason Closure will satisfy everyone. This is because this principle, 
or more accurately a version of it concerning ‘ought’s, has a rather complicated status in ethics and in deontic 
logic: some think it is obviously true (Hilpinen and Føllesdal 1971: 22 and Nute and Yu 1997: 5); other 
obviously false. But, I submit, this fact—that people’s assessments differ—tells us that a thorough and even 
handed assessment of Single Reason Closure requires careful consideration of both its merits and its problems. 
This paper will show some positive applications of Single Reason Closure. This contributes one important piece 
of evidence to the large body of evidence that we must consider in order to responsibly evaluate Single Reason 
Closure. What this piece of evidence tells us is that those who wish to reject Single Reason Closure must identify 
an alternative to it that is capable of resolving our two problems. So the main contribution of this paper with 
regard to Single Reason Closure will not be to defend it from problems others have raised but to highlight some 
underappreciated virtues of this principle. 
That said, let me make two points about Single Reason Closure and the cases that motivate it. First let 
me mention one weakening of Single Reason Closure that avoids many problems for this principle that people 
raise (e.g., the problem that Single Reason Closure entails that we have reasons to do “tautological actions”  such 
as murder or not murder). The weakening is this: 
 
if there is a reason for S to do a, doing a involves doing b, and doing b is under S’s 
intentional control, then there is a reason for S to do b 
 
where we say that doing an act is under an agent’s intentional control just in case both (1) if she intends to do 
it, she does it and (2) if she intends to not do it, she does not do it.  It will be easy for the interested reader to 
check that even this restricted version of Single Reason Closure gives rise to the problem that I have described 
when combined with Consistent Reasons Agglomeration. And though I did not complicate the presentation of my 
solution so that it only validates this restricted principle, it will not be hard to see that the solution could be 
modified in this way. 
 Next, recall that we considered Single Reason Closure in the first place because we wanted to explain 
why there is a reason to drive less than one hundred miles per hour given that there is a reason to drive less 
than fifty miles per hour in Speeding Law. The second issue I would like to consider is an objection to the idea 
that there really is a reason to drive less than one hundred miles per hour in that case. 
The objection begins with the observation that one can drive less than one hundred miles per hour 
by driving exactly eighty miles per hour. But, plausibly, there is no reason to drive exactly eighty miles per 
                                               
32 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this issue. 
27 
hour in this case. On the basis of these two premises, the objection concludes that there is no reason to drive 
less than one hundred miles per hour. 
 Before responding to what I take the heart of the objection, let me make two preliminary points. 
First Single Reason Closure alone does not imply that there is a reason to drive exactly eighty miles per hour so it 
gets this fact right. Second, not only is there not a reason to drive exactly eighty miles per hour, there is a 
reason not to drive exactly eighty miles per hour in this case. And Single Reason Closure is the most natural 
explanation of why there is this reason. Since driving less than fifty miles per hour involves failing to drive 
exactly eighty miles per hour, Single Reason Closure predicts that there is a reason not to drive exactly eighty 
miles per hour. These are two correct results about the case and the second result follows from Single Reason 
Closure and is a piece of evidence in its favor. 
However, the heart of the objection, I take it, does not focus on whether Single Reason Closure alone 
predicts that driving exactly eighty miles an hour is something that you have a reason to do (as I said, it does 
not). Rather the heart of the objection is that Single Reason Closure predicts that there is a reason to do 
something (namely, drive less than one hundred miles per hour) and one way of complying with this reason 
(namely driving exactly eighty miles per hour) is not something you have a reason to do and indeed have a 
reason against doing. This observation seems to be that it cannot be the case that there is no reason to do an 
act which is a way of complying with something you have a reason to do. 
So the bridge premise this objection relies on is this: 
 
if there is a reason to do a and b is a way of doing a, then there must be a reason to do b 
 
or something similar to this perhaps restricted to cases in which you ought to do a as well. Since there is no 
reason to drive exactly eighty miles per hour, the objector concludes by modus tollens that there is no reason 
to drive less than one hundred miles per hour. My response to the objection is that this bridge premise is false. 
 My response rests on three claims. First, at least in some cases (though perhaps not all) we have a 
reason to accomplish an end E that gives us a reason to take a (perhaps necessary, perhaps not) means M to 
E that is not a sufficient means to E. For example, I may have an excellent reason to drive my friend to the 
airport and that gives me a reason to clear the snow off of my car. 
 Next consider that there will always be a sufficient means M’ to accomplishing M that precludes 
accomplishing E.33 To return to the example, a sufficient means to clearing the snow off of my car would be 
to murder my friend, steal his shovel, and use it to shovel the snow off of my car. 
 Finally I submit there is no reason to do M’ (at least only given the reason to do E and the reason to 
do M that it generates). To return to the example, there is no reason to murder my friend, steal his shovel, 
and shovel the snow off of my car. 
 These three general claims then provide a counterexample to the bridge premise because there is a 
                                               
33 There will always be such an M’ because we can always let M’ be [M and not-E]. 
28 
reason to do M, M’ is a way of doing M, and nonetheless there is no reason to do M’. More generally, this 
argument suggest that the bridge principle is false when applied to reasons to do acts that are generated by 
other reasons. It should be no surprise then that there is no reason to drive exactly eighty miles per hour in 
Speeding Law.34, 35 
 This conclude my response to concerns about Single Reason Closure. That said, these comments do not 
suffice to address all of the problems that have been offered for Single Reason Closure. But as I said, my aim is 
not to solve all the problem for Single Reason Closure here. It is to show that there are certain problems 
understanding conflicting reasons and their connection to what we ought to do and that Single Reason Closure 
can be a part of a solution to these problems. That said, for those interested in these problems, I briefly 
discuss them in a note.36 
 
A.2 A Simple Formal Model 
 The formal theory that I will develop is an adaptation of a formal system developed by John Horty 
(2012). I adapt the system in two ways. First I considerably simplify the system. Though my ideas could be 
                                               
34 It is important to be clear here about why this response is not question begging against a reasonable objector. A reasonable objector 
may reject the motivation for Single Reason Closure for the reason provided, but she should not reject the first claim of my argument 
(the claim that sometimes we have reasons to take non-sufficient means to our ends). For those who wish to reject the first 
assumption of my argument, I do not offer any response. I simply note that this is a highly theoretical commitment that, to my mind, 
hardly provides a starting point for an objection to simple judgements about cases unless the commitment can be bolstered by strong 
independent argument. 
35 Counterexamples to the ‘ought’ version of the bridge premise can also be had with the help of the simple observation that for 
almost anything we ought to do there are sufficient means for doing it that are impermissible. Some of these counterexamples may 
also falsify the bridge premise stated in the text but judgments about these examples involving reasons are less clear.  
36 I discuss only two puzzles here. Begin with, a generalization of Ross’s paradox (Ross 1941). Though I do not have the space here to 
engage with the literature on this topic in the level of detail it deserves, let me make four points. First a popular solution to Ross’s 
paradox explains the paradox away on pragmatic grounds (Castañeda 1981). Second though not clearly impossible, it is not obvious 
that the speeding law case can be explained without allowing the Rossian inference: that case can be thought of as going from ‘there is 
a reason to drive forty-nine mph or forty-eight mph or…’ to ‘there is a reason to drive ninety-nine mph or ninety-eight mph or … or 
forty-nine mph or forty-eight mph or….’. Third, Single Reason Closure is entailed by other plausible principle so those who reject it face 
the task of explaining which of these principles they reject. For example Single Reason Closure follows from the principle that if there is 
a reason to do a and b, then there is a reason to do a together with the principle that there is a reason to do a  just in case there is a 
reason to do b when doing a involves doing b and doing b involves doing a. Fourth and finally, the Rossian intuition is suspect. Apply 
the same intuition pump to neither mailing nor burning the letter. Neither mailing nor burning the letter is an act that you do not have 
a reason to do and indeed an act you have a reason to not do. So this intuition pump suggests that you have strong reasons to not 
[neither sending nor burning the letter]. Now if we make the extremely weak assumption that you have a reason to do a then you also 
have a reason to do b where b is the result of performing a de Morgans transformation on a, it follows that you do indeed have a 
reason to mail or burn the letter. So the Rossian intuition itself pulls in both directions and those who wish to draw the conclusion 
that Single Reason Closure fails based on it must face up to denying much more than Single Reason Closure. 
Next consider a generalization of Professor Procrastinate type cases (Jackson and Pargetter 1986). Again, there is a rich 
literature on this topic that I cannot do justice to, but let me say two things in response. First and most importantly let me note that 
one prominent family of accounts of this case and solution to the so-called actualism/possibilism debate it is involved in preserves 
Single Reason Closure. This family of accounts is motivated by consideration independent of the ones here and I myself find these 
solutions plausible (see Portmore 2013 and Ross 2012 for a recent defense). Second, one of the original arguments used to suggest 
that we have a failure of Single Reason Closure in the Professor Procrastinate case involved appealing to a certain simple consequentialist 
semantics for ‘ought’. But this semantics is controversial not only for its implication in first order ethics but also because (i) it is not 
the only consequentialist approach possible and there are alternatives that validate Single Reason Closure (Portmore 2011), (ii) non-
consequentialist semantics abound that do not have this result such as the usual modal semantics given for the so-called Standard 
Deontic Logic and such as a more recent semantic treatment due to Wedgwood 2006 that integrates insights from logic, linguistics, 
and moral philosophy, and (iii) the approach that I develop is an alternative account of the nature of what we ought to do so the 
argument from Jackson’s theory simply begs the question against it. 
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developed using the full resources of Horty’s system, I am simplifying here in order to introduce my main 
ideas in the most approachable form. Second as will become clearer as we go on, I interpret some of the 
objects in my system differently than Horty interprets the analogous objects in his system. As we will see, this 
difference in interpretation is important because it is what will allow me to do something Horty cannot do: 
reject Reasons Explain ‘Ought’s Directly while accepting ‘Ought’s Entail Reasons and thereby solve our problem.37 
Let’s develop the system. To begin, instead of discussing action and involvements among actions, I 
will simplify things by discussing sentences and logical entailments among them. Let lowercase Greek letters 
α, β, γ, etc. be sentences. Accordingly, we will also officially have to treat ‘reason’ and ‘ought’ as operators on 
sentences. 
Next since we know that the notion of a non-derivative reason is going to play an important role in 
this system, we should introduce a way of representing them. So let !(α) represent a non-derivative reason to 
do α. While this formalism does not allow us to represent what the reason is to do α, we do not need to add 
such details to our system because our problem does not turn on exactly what the reason is. 
 Since we will often be interested in discussing not just individual non-derivative reasons but also 
collections of non-derivative reasons, we should introduce a device for representing these as well. We 
therefore use ℜ for a set of non-derivative reasons. 
It will also turn out to be useful when we are giving some definitions below to have a function, 
Consequent, that takes a non-derivative reason and returns the thing that we have a non-derivative reason to do 
and similarly for sets of non-derivative reasons. So we define: 
 
Consequent[!(α)]=α 
Consequent[ℜ]={x| y∈ℜ and Consequent[y]=x} 
 
Next, we must distinguish the undefeated non-derivative reasons from the non-derivative reasons. 
To do this, let’s help ourselves to an ordering on non-derivative reasons ≤. We read !(α) ≤ !(β) as 
‘there is a least as good of a non-derivative reason to α as there is to do β’. We assume ≤ is a reflexive 
relation in the sense that the following claim holds: 
 
!(α) ≤ !(α) 
 
and assume that  ≤ is a transitive relation in the sense that the following claim holds: 
 
if !(α) ≤ !(β) and !(β) ≤ !(γ), then !(α) ≤ !(γ) 
 
Finally, since we have seen that it plausible to think that there are equally good conflicting reasons, we know 
                                               
37 Horty notices that his system cannot accept ‘Ought’s Entail Reasons and, for this reason, says he has an “austere” theory of reasons 
(2012: ch. 2, §1). By my lights, such austerity is a cost and the interpretation provided here can be thought of as an amendment to his 
system that does not have this cost. 
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that there can be situations where α is inconsistent with β, !(α) ≤ !(β), and !(β) ≤ !( α). 
 We can now define an operator Undefeated that takes us from a set of non-derivative reason to the 
subset of it that contains undefeated non-derivative reasons: 
 
Undefeated≤(ℜ)={x∈ℜ|there is no y∈ℜ such that (i) x < y  and (ii) Consequent[x] is 
inconsistent with Consequent[y]} 
 
In other words, a reason to do some act is defeated if there is a better reason to do some act that conflicts 
with it. And an undefeated reason is just a reason that is not defeated.38, 39 
 There are many simplifications involved in this formalism (see n. 36), but it is enough for our 
purpose. And our purpose, recall, is to develop an account on which non-derivative reasons explain derivative 
reasons and ‘ought’s by showing that they stand in an important logical relation to non-derivative reasons. 
What we still need to do is describe this logical relation. 
 To do this, we need the notion of a most inclusive collection of non-derivative reasons. We define 
this in terms a maximal consistent subset of a certain set as follows: 
  
A is a maximal consistent subset of B iff (1) A⊆B, (2) A is consistent, and (3) it is not the case 
that there is a C such that C is consistent and A⊂C⊆B. 
 
With this in hand, we can now define a relation |~HNRE that we interpret as telling us how non-derivative reasons 
explain ‘ought’s. 
This relation will hold between a collection of reasons of a certain weight and an ‘ought’ just in case 
the reasons explain the ‘ought’. Recall that a collection of reasons of a certain weight is formally represented 
by a pair 〈ℜ, ≤〉 and we can represent an ‘ought’ with the operator O. So we may define this relation as 
follows: 
 
〈ℜ, ≤〉 |~HNRE O(α) iff M α for every maximal consistent subset M of 
Consequent[Undefeated≤(ℜ)] 
 
where  is the logical consequence relation of ordinary propositional logic.  And we can also define when 
when |~HNRE holds between a pair <ℜ, ≤> and the claim ‘there is a reason for it to be the case that α’ which 
                                               
38 Strictly speaking, what I have defined is the notion of a reason being not worse than any other reasons. A reason being not worse 
and a reason being at least as good come apart in cases where reasons are incomparable with one another. But in order to present my 
ideas as simply as possible, I will ignore incomparability among reasons. Indeed, there are a whole host of phenomena concerning the 
weight of reasons that I will be ignoring in order to present my system simply (e.g., undercutting defeat, attenuation, how multiple 
reasons can “add up” to provide more support for an act, reinstatement). Luckily, as I said before, my system can be developed using 
the full resources of Horty’s system and these extra resources were developed precisely to understand these phenomena (see Hansen 
2008 and Horty 2012 for further discussion). 
39 We do not focus on non-derivative reasons that are better than reasons that conflict with them because the set of such non-derivative 
reasons is empty in cases like Two Breakfasts and Lunch-Coffee-Dinner where we have equally good non-derivative reasons (cf. Horty 
2003: 572-573).  
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we write as R(α): 
 
〈ℜ, ≤〉 |~HNRE R(α) iff M  α for some maximal consistent subset M of Consequent[ℜ] 
 
As I have defined it, R(α) is a claim about reasons derivative or otherwise. Having defined this notion, we 
may define a derivative reason as a reason that is not non-derivative. Formally this ends up looking like this: 
 
〈ℜ, ≤〉 |~HNRE DR(α) iff 〈ℜ, ≤〉 |~HNRE  R(α) and !(α)∉ℜ. 
 
where DR(α) is read as ‘there is a derivative reason for it to be the case that α’. 
 Thus, my formal framework adapts Horty’s formal framework by thinking of the elements of ℜ as 
non-derivative reasons.40 It is easy to use this framework to now formally verify each of the claims I made 
about the principles. 
 Here I will verify Single Reason Closure, Consistent Non-Derivative Reasons Agglomeration, and ‘Ought’s Entail 
Reasons. I leave it to the reader to perform the simple verification of other claims that she may be interested in: 
 
(1) Formally, Single Reason Closure says that if 〈ℜ, ≤〉 |~HNRE R(α) and {α}  β, then 〈ℜ, ≤〉 |~HNRE 
R(β). Suppose then 〈ℜ, ≤〉 |~HNRE R(α) and {α}  β. Since 〈ℜ, ≤〉 |~HNRE R(α), there must be 
some maximal consistent subset M of Consequent[ℜ] such that M   α. Since    is a transitive 
relation and since {α}  β, M  β. Thus, 〈ℜ, ≤〉 |~HNRE R(β). 
 
(2) Formally, Consistent Non-Derivative Reasons Agglomeration says that if !(α)∈ℜ , !(β)∈ℜ, and {α, β} is 
consistent, 〈ℜ, ≤〉 |~HNRE R(α   β). Assume !(α)∈ℜ , !(β)∈ℜ, and {α, β} is consistent. There is 
then some maximal consistent subset M of Consequent[ℜ] such that {α, β}⊆M. Since {α, β}   α   
β and since   is monotonic, M   α   β. Thus, 〈ℜ, ≤〉 |~HNRE R(α   β). 
 
(3) Formally ‘Ought’s Entail Reasons says that if 〈ℜ, ≤〉 |~HNRE O(α), then 〈ℜ, ≤〉 |~HNRE R(α). So 
suppose 〈ℜ, ≤〉 |~HNRE O(α). Consider some maximal consistent subset of Consequent[Undefeated≤[ℜ]], 
M. By our supposition, M   α. By the definition of an Undefeated≤, M⊆Consequent[ℜ] and M is 
consistent. So M is either a maximal consistent subset of Consequent[ℜ] or it isn’t. If it is, then we 
have 〈ℜ, ≤〉 |~HNRE R(α) because M   α. If it is not, then by definition there is some maximal 
consistent subset of Consequent[ℜ], M’, such that M⊆M’. By the monotonicity of  , it follows that M’  
 α. So 〈ℜ, ≤〉 |~HNRE R(α). Thus, 〈ℜ, ≤〉 |~HNRE R(α). 
 
  
                                               
40 It may be worth noting how this system is related to two other systems. First, the system that can be found in Goble 2013: §4.4 is 
very similar to mine. When I came up with my system, Goble’s paper did not contain the system that is now found in his §4.4. At that 
time, the system that was closest to mine did not validate ‘Ought’s Entail Reasons. Goble since has, perhaps independently, developed 
the system now found in §4.4. Second Portmore 2013 argues on very different grounds for a special case of my view (see n. 36 for 
further discussion). According to Portmore, if an agent has a non-derivative reason to do α, a non-derivative reason to do β, and α≠β, 
then α and β are inconsistent. In effect, Portmore thinks that there are only non-derivative reasons to do maximal consistent acts. 
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